“Stress” Claims: Interpreting Section 30A of the South Australian Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986

I start by noting that the provision which covers compensation claims for “stress” in fact covers all illnesses or disorders of the mind, for example anxiety, depression, and panic attacks. Notwithstanding what is still written on medical certificates from time to time, stress is not a medical condition, but rather an outside influence, a stressor; it is something that might, individually or collectively, lead to an illness or disorder of the mind.

Once a claim for compensation for an illness or disorder of the mind has been lodged, a series of specific questions need to be addressed before a determination to accept or reject the claim can be made. Those specific questions are, in effect, set out in section 30A of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986 (SA) (‘the Act’). These threshold questions under section 30A are specific to claims for illness or disorders of the mind; they do not apply in relation to any other category of claim under the South Australian legislation.

This paper deals with the way in which the section 30A provisions apply. As will be apparent from the discussion set out below, this task is far from straightforward.

2. THE WORDING OF SECTION 30A

The predecessor to the present section 30A, section 30(2a) came into operation on 1 July 1994. It subsequently changed to its present form and now reads:

30A—Psychiatric disabilities

A disability consisting of an illness or disorder of the mind is compensable if and only if—

(a)       the employment was a substantial cause of the disability; and

(b)       the disability did not arise wholly or predominantly from—

(i)      reasonable action taken in a reasonable manner by the employer to transfer, demote, discipline, counsel, retrench or dismiss the worker; or

(ii)      a decision of the employer, based on reasonable grounds, not to award or provide a promotion, transfer, or benefit in connection with the worker’s employment; or

(iii)     reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner by the employer in connection with the worker’s employment; or

(iv)     reasonable action taken in a reasonable manner under this Act affecting the worker.

The next part of the paper considers the way in which the separate parts of the provisions of section 30A apply.

3. THE APPLICATION OF SECTION 30A

Those who have had to apply this section in practice will understand how notoriously difficult this can be; there are not only difficult questions of law that arise, but the process of application also involves a difficult factual investigation. The analysis involves a series of steps, which require consideration of a number of different tests at different stages.

3.1 The introduction to section 30A

The wording of the introduction sets the scene for claims of this type and identifies a number of preliminary factors which must be adequately considered before a compensating authority can move to the next stage, the consideration of the exclusionary provisions.

3.1.1 “A disability” and “an illness or disorder of the mind”

The worker must suffer a disability[1] which disability consists of an illness or disorder of the mind. The disability is normally the condition suffered by the worker. This appears straightforward enough: the condition must be an illness or disorder of the mind (anxiety, depression, etc) of which stress is but one condition. Guidance on the meaning of this term has been provided by Justice Lander when sitting on the Full Court of the Supreme Court:

The expression ‘illness or disorder of the mind’ is not otherwise defined in the Act but no doubt includes a psychiatric condition and any other condition which can be categorised as an illness or disorder of the mind. A disability means any physical or mental injury and includes a secondary disability, namely a disability that is or results from an aggravation, acceleration, exacerbation, deterioration or recurrence of the prior disability.[2]

While it is clear that the purpose of section 30A is to preclude workers from being entitled to compensation in certain situations, it can only ever do so where a worker suffers an illness or disorder of the mind. The disqualifying provisions simply do not apply if a worker suffers a physical condition as a result of one of the disqualifying factors, such as reasonable administrative action. For example the onset of Type II diabetes caused or contributed to by stress arising from reasonable administrative action within the workplace would be compensable (provided of course that a causal nexus could be established to the requisite degree between the work-related stress and the onset of the condition).

An interesting issue is whether section 30A applies to a claim by a worker who suffers a later illness in the form of a psychiatric sequelae secondary to a primary physical injury, which later illness or disorder of the mind is itself incapacitating. In Nguyen v The Arrowcrest Group[3] the worker put in a second claim alleging a psychological sequelae to an earlier physical injury. The conclusion which appears to have been reached in Nguyen by Deputy President Parsons in the Workers Compensation Tribunal[4] is that claims for illnesses or disorders of the mind that are sequelae to earlier claims do not come within section 30A. It should be noted that the Full Bench of the Tribunal later cited Nguyen as authority for the proposition that a psychological overlay which was secondary to a physical injury does not attract the application of section 30A.[5] Thus it would seem settled that secondary illness or disorder of the mind, secondary to a primary physical injury, does not attract the attention or consideration of section 30A.

3.1.2 “is compensable if and only if”

Having now understood that the worker’s condition is a disability which consists of an illness or disorder of the mind, we are told that it will still be compensable only if further additional conditions are satisfied.

3.2 Section 30A(a): was employment a substantial cause?

The first point that needs to be made is that the onus is on the worker to establish all of the matters in section 30A (a) and (b).[6]

The second point that needs to be made with this provision is that it does not require employment to be the substantial cause of the disability, but only a substantial cause of the disability. Therefore, if there are a number of substantial causes of the worker’s disability, of which the employment is just one, that is sufficient for the purpose of satisfying this part of the section.

3.2.1 What is “a substantial cause”?

The question of whether the worker’s employment was “a substantial cause” of her disability was the critical issue before the Tribunal in Auld v The Institute of Medical and Veterinary Science.[7] It was alleged the worker had a difficult personality and that there were a number of non-employment related reasons which led to the disability she was claiming under section 30A. Acting Deputy President Thompson of the Tribunal held that the worker was only required to prove that employment was a substantial cause of the disability and that the employer could not rely upon the fact that substantial non-employment causes also existed in order to deprive the worker of benefits under the Act. The employer argued that there were a number of other non-employment causes which had the effect of either being the sole cause or were so grave and persuasive that they rendered the employment-related causes as not a substantial cause. His Honour held that although there may have been significant non-employment factors that were also operating with the worker:

… that is not to say that as a matter of law employment factors were not ‘a substantial cause’ of the disability. If the Act had been worded ‘the substantial cause’ I would have taken the view that her personality – particularly her intransigence and inability to accept direction was the substantial cause …[8] (emphasis added).

The employer appealed to the Full Bench of the Tribunal against the decision at first instance in this case. The appeal failed. Two of three members of the Full Bench said:

“A determination of the issue of whether employment is ‘a substantial cause’ is a determination for the trier of fact. Reasonable minds might differ on established facts as to whether or not employment was or was not a substantial cause but just because we might take a different view does not mean that such a decision should be corrected on appeal given that an appeal to this Full Bench is limited to a question of law: s86(1).”[9]

Deputy President Parsons reviewed what constitutes “a substantial cause” for the purpose of section 30A in McLeod v WorkCover/Allianz (Jarrett Synergy Pty Ltd)[10]:

The issue in these proceedings is whether the applicant’s employment … was a substantial cause of that disability. …

A substantial cause in the context of s 30A is one which is significant or not inconsiderable. The use of the indefinite article “a” acknowledges that there may be more than one substantial cause. Potential causes of a disability of this kind must be weighed and compared to determine which are substantial. … The concept of causation to be applied to the facts of this case is that expressed by Lander J in WorkCover Corporation v Sheriff (1996 Supreme Court of South Australia S5831) namely whether in the light of evidence of more than one possible cause of the disability, the employment was significant enough to still be able to say that the disability arose from the employment. The process by which this conclusion will be reached involves the making of findings of fact based on a common sense evaluation of the chain of events.[11]

The Deputy President’s decision in McLeod was appealed to the Full Bench of the Tribunal which dismissed the appeal and cited the above passage with approval.[12]

Therefore, once it is determined that one of the causes of a worker’s illness or disorder of the mind is substantial and that cause is work-related, the worker has satisfied this test. It appears therefore that the critical issue to determine in this context will be whether or not the work cause is substantial in the circumstances of the case. Accordingly, while the term “a substantial cause” initially appears to place quite a significant restriction on claims for an illnesses or disorders of the mind, it is extremely unlikely to be decisive in having the rejection of a determination confirmed if work factors appear to be in some way relevant on an objective analysis of the fact. That said, where it is apparent on the information that there a number of possible causes of the illness, this is an issue which requires careful investigation and consideration.

3.2.2 “and”

The use of the word “and” shows that before a worker can be entitled to compensation for a claim of this type, he or she must establish that not only was employment a substantial cause of the disability, but also show that his or her disability did not result wholly or predominantly from any of the disqualifying factors listed in section 30A(b). This will always inevitably involve a consideration of a variety of complex factual matters, their inter-relationship with each other, and the inter-relationship of both of these matters with the legislative provisions, after findings of fact have been made.

3.3 Section 30A(b): disqualifying factors

3.3.1 “the disability did not arise wholly or predominantly from”

As will be apparent from the discussion set out below, it is of critical importance to understand the inter-relationship between determining whether the action falls within one of the categories specified in section 30A(b)(i) to (iv) (reasonable administrative action, reasonable disciplinary action, etc) on the one hand and assessing whether the disability arose wholly or predominantly as a result of such action on the other. The case law establishes that the assessment of each of these matters is a quite separate task, however the assessment of these factors is probably inextricably intertwined; the process that is required is actually to determine first whether one of the disqualifying factors exists and, if it does, to then determine whether the disability arose wholly or predominantly from that factor.

The Full Court of the Supreme Court discussed the issue of predominant cause in WorkCover Corporation of South Australia v Summers.[13] In that case, Chief Justice Doyle held that:

“stress caused by an inability to cope with the job itself, to put things simply, is not stress which arises wholly or predominantly from administrative action taken by the employer in connection with the worker’s employment…”[14]

The worker was indeed found to suffer a stress-related condition due to her inability to cope with the requirements of her job. Therefore, as the immediate cause of the worker’s disability was not wholly or predominantly caused by administrative action, the disqualifying provisions did not operate. Hence the disability was compensable.[15]

3.3.2 What is meant by “reasonable”?

All four disqualifying factors make extensive use of the word “reasonable”. It is apparent that before a compensating authority, whether it be an exempt employer or an agent, can reject a worker’s claim it must be satisfied that the employer has acted in a reasonable manner. The steps taken by the employer must, on an objective analysis, be regarded as reasonable.

What then does “reasonable” mean? In the context of the WorkCover legislation, the term “reasonable” has been considered in some cases. For example, in Norah Price v The Corporation[16] the Workers Compensation Appeal Tribunal (the predecessor of the current Tribunal) said:

… the issue of what was reasonable in the circumstances was a question of fact. It involved the decision maker in a judgment based upon the facts as were known or ought to have been known or ought to have been known at the relevant time and without the benefit of hindsight… Moreover, it means ‘reasonable’ given all the circumstances… It is an objective test.[17]

In Kalogiannidis v The Corporation[18] the Appeal Tribunal said: “The concept of reasonableness… requires an employer to deal with its employees fairly and honestly.”[19]

So we conclude that “reasonable” (in the context of reasonable administrative action taken under the Act, reasonable disciplinary action, etc) involves reasonableness in all the circumstances.

The difficulty of assessing the reasonableness or otherwise of an employer’s action was commented upon by Deputy President Judge Gilchrist in Wilkinson v The State of South Australia (Department of Correctional Services)[20]. However His Honour also noted that in terms of order of consideration, an assessment of reasonableness was not the first step to be taken in the process of assessing claims under section 30A:

I think this case highlights a difficulty that s 30A creates. It not only discriminates against a particular type of disability by requiring it to meet a higher threshold to be compensable than that which applies to other disabilities, it also employs terminology that is usually associated with notions of fault. Expressions like, “reasonable action”, “reasonable manner” and “reasonable grounds” all connote an objective assessment of the employer’s dealings with the worker and as a result some compensating authorities and registered employers in responding to stress claims focus upon the employer’s conduct in the false belief that if the employer’s dealings with the worker were objectively fair, the worker’s claim must fail.

However, as Lander J explained in Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation v Keen (1998) 71 SASR 42 at 47, a consideration of the reasonableness or otherwise of the employer’s dealings with the worker will only arise if the disability is wholly or predominantly attributable to one or other of the potentially disqualifying events. If there are matters related to the worker’s employment that do not have the character of one or other of these events a consideration of the employer’s conduct might not arise because the worker will often thereby have discharged his or her onus of proving that the disability was not predominantly attributable to one or other of the potentially disqualifying events that are stipulated in the provision.[21]

3.3.3 The nature of the employment activity

It is important to properly categorise the employment activity to determine whether it actually comes within any of the section 30A criteria. For example, is it: an administrative act; an act of discipline or counselling; an action taken under the Act affecting the worker? The importance of this is that if one of the qualifying criteria specified is not met, the matter ends there and the worker will be entitled to compensation (assuming that he or she can satisfy the causation test). For example, if it is asserted that a worker is not entitled to compensation because the disability arose predominantly from reasonable administrative action taken by the employer in a reasonable manner, but it is ultimately decided that the action taken by the employer was not in fact an administrative action, the employer cannot obtain the benefit of that disqualifying provision and, as long as the worker shows that the illness or disorder of the mind arose out of employment, the worker will be entitled to compensation. In other words, the strict liability principles will operate.

I will now consider each of the four disqualifying factors in turn.

3.3.4 Section 30A(b)(i): disqualifying factor 1 – action to transfer, demote, discipline, etc

This factor, by itself, covers quite a wide range of employment activities: transfer, demotion, a disciplinary act, counselling, retrenchment, or dismissal. In some cases, it will be clear that one of these activities has occurred; for example, the fact of dismissal or the fact of retrenchment is normally clear. In other cases, it might be less clear; for example, an employer might say that a certain activity amounts to a disciplinary step or counselling, whereas the worker might take issue with this.

In Burner v Serco Australia[22], the Full Bench of the Tribunal commented that:

There is no doubt that the worker had the right to expect that he would be afforded natural justice in connection with the disciplinary proceedings. In general terms, we respectfully adopt the summary of natural justice provided upon a Privy Council in University of Samon v Fernado (1960) 1 WLR 223 at 232:-

First, I think that the person charged should know the nature of the accusation made; secondly, that he should be given the opportunity to state his case; and thirdly of course that the Tribunal should act in good faith. I do not think that there is really anything more.’[23]

In my view, this is a particularly useful summary of the process which should be adopted by an employer in order to place itself in the best possible position to have its conduct held to be reasonable.

Whicker v WorkCover (SA) Ltd (SignCraft Pty Ltd)[24] is another useful illustration of the approach to be adopted when applying this provision. In that case, Deputy President Gilchrist noted that:

The proper and effective management of human resources requires much more than a clinical application of established industrial principles to a particular state of affairs. It also involves the careful reflection of the particular circumstances of each case. A rigid adherence to the principles declared in judgments and decisions of Courts and Tribunals without an appropriate consideration of the particular facts of the matter can lead to inappropriate action being taken.

Moreover, despite what has been said in the decisions of the Court and Commission, it is not the case that an employer is obliged in every meeting involving an employee at which poor work performance is discussed, to issue a warning about potential dismissal. One should not lose sight of the fact that the ultimate objective of disciplining and counselling an employee in respect of poor work performance is to improve the worker’s performance at work, not to have his or her employment terminated.[25]

3.3.5 Section 30A(b)(ii): disqualifying factor 2 – A decision not to provide a transfer, benefit, promotion, etc

Once again it should be noted that the concept of reasonableness underpins this provision. In that regard it will be noted that the decision of the employer has, in any case, to be “based on reasonable grounds”.

A factor which needs to be borne in mind when considering this provision is that it relates only to a decision. It does not relate to the process leading up to the decision, but the decision itself. Insofar as this provision is concerned, it must be established that the decision is “based on reasonable grounds”.

Although the process leading to the making of the decision does not come within the parameters of this provision, I have little doubt that that process would quite properly come within the parameters of one of the other disqualifying provisions. For example, it will be noted that reasonable action taken in a reasonable manner in connection with a transfer specifically comes within part (i). Likewise, I see no reason why steps involved in the process leading up to a decision regarding a promotion or provision of a benefit to a worker would not come under the umbrella of part (iii), reasonable administrative action taken in a reasonable manner by the employer in connection with a worker’s employment.

3.3.6 Section 30A(b)(iii): disqualifying factor 3 – Administrative action

On the definition of “administrative action”, the Chief Justice said in Summers,[26]:

… I consider that the expression “administrative action” is probably intended to apply to decisions or actions by the employer which are in some way related to the workings or functioning of the workplace rather than the actual tasks performed by the worker …[27]

In Keen[28] on the topic of administrative action, Lander J said, when discussing whether:

“[the] administrative action was reasonable and if reasonable whether it was taken in a reasonable manner by the employer …

Both of these further matters will be an inquiry of fact to be determined objectively. Whether the administrative action is reasonable is simply a matter of fact. Whether the administrative action was taken in a reasonable manner by the employer will depend upon the administrative action, the facts and circumstances giving rise to the requirement for the administrative action, the way in which the administrative action impacts upon the worker and the circumstances in which the administrative action was implemented and any other matters relevant to determining whether the administrative action was taken in a reasonable manner by the employer.[29]

This is an excellent summary of the factors which must be reviewed when considering whether or not a worker should or should not be entitled to compensation under this provision and the manner in which they should be considered.

3.3.7 Section 30A(b)(iv): disqualifying factor 4 – Action under the Act

Interestingly, it appears that there has not been a case decided directly on the application on this disqualifying factor. The intent however is clear enough: if a worker develops an illness or disorder of the mind as a result of action taken in a reasonable manner under the Act, he of she will not entitled to compensation for that illness or disorder, as long as the action is itself reasonable action.

Therefore, if a worker develops an illness or disorder of the mind as a result of a reaction to the rejection of his or her claim (which illness itself causes or increases incapacity), the worker will not be entitled to compensation in connection with that illness if the action taken in rejecting the claim is reasonable. I do not believe that it is necessary for the original determination to be confirmed; the fact that a determination is wrong does not, of itself, establish that the determination was unreasonable (although it will clearly go a good way in that direction). This provision, like all the others which require a consideration of matters of reasonableness, will be a question of fact in each case.

By contrast, if a compensating authority rejects a worker’s claim but does so, for example, without any substantiating evidence or for some other reason which is considered inappropriate and hence unreasonable, the worker will have discharged his or her onus of establishing that section 30A(b)(iv) does not feature, in which case the disability will be compensable.

3.4 Assessing the section 30A(b) circumstances: the importance of procedural fairness

Where relevant during this paper I have emphasised the importance of understanding and applying the concept of reasonableness in arriving at correct conclusions on these claims. While I do not believe that there is any simple method of assessing claims of this nature, I also believe you will be greatly assisted in the process if you consider whether the principles of procedural fairness have been applied in relation to the disqualifying provisions.

I therefore recommend that a major focus of your consideration of claims of this type (assuming you otherwise conclude that they involve administrative action, etc), should be directed to the question of whether procedural fairness has been shown to the worker. If procedural fairness has been shown to the worker, it is my view that the compensating authority will be in a very good position to be able to establish that the conduct taken by the employer was, in the circumstances, reasonable.[30]

Remember, reasonableness is a question of fact in each case. The question of whether action – whether it be administrative action or whether it be action taken to transfer, demote, discipline, counsel, retrench or dismiss the worker – was reasonable, will often come down to a question of whether the worker has been afforded procedural fairness.

Not unlike the term “reasonable”, the term “procedural fairness” is a regularly used term but unhelpful one which is rarely given precise definition. Given the lack of a precise definition – which I think is realistically impossible in situations such as this – I suggest that an appropriate definition is one that simply adopts the words of the phrase: has the worker been treated fairly in a manner which is regarded as procedurally correct? If it can be shown that the employer has, in the particular circumstances of the case, shown procedural fairness to the worker, it is in my view almost inevitable that a finding will be made that the employer’s conduct was reasonable.

4. HELPFUL HINTS ON ASSESSING SECTION 30A CLAIMS

The analysis set out above identifies and highlights the complexities that will normally arise in considering and determining claims for illnesses or disorders of the mind. It should be apparent from this analysis why disputed claims relating to illnesses or disorders of the mind often involve the longest and most difficult hearings (and hence are the most expensive to run).

At the conclusion of this analysis of the application of the section, certain observations are worth making.

First, it is vital with claims which have such an obvious potential to become protracted disputes – not to mention the protracted anxiety caused to all involved in the process if the claim is disputed – to carefully focus on the real legal issues at the earliest possible time and thoroughly analyse your case.

Secondly, in addition to difficult legal issues, there are also generally significant factual disputes that arise in cases of this type. Moreover, and to make the situation even more difficult, as the factual disputes inevitably (at least in my experience), involve personality conflicts, the genesis of these claims is normally in events that occurred years before a claim is lodged. To add to all of this, there can often be a considerable degree of tension, conflict, and bitterness between the parties.

The effect of this is to make the factual investigation of the claim quite difficult, both as to making a proper assessment of disputes of fact as well as correctly applying the provisions to those facts.

However, when distilled down to its basics, I see the exercise of considering claims of this type as requiring an assessment of the following factors:

The first stage involves assessing whether the worker’s disability is an illness or disorder of the mind. This is usually a straightforward matter. There is often no dispute on this issue.
The second stage involves determining whether the worker’s employment was a substantial cause of the disability. This is more difficult, but will always be a question of fact. On the basis of the case law, the worker should generally be able to satisfy this test.
The third and most difficult stage then involves a two-stage process. One part of that involves the consideration of the section 30A(b)(i) to (iv) factors. For example, was the action disciplinary or counselling action, and if so was it reasonable and taken in a reasonable manner by the employer? Or was the action administrative action and, if so, was it reasonable and taken in a reasonable manner by the employer? These will all be questions of fact.

This part of the exercise will clearly be difficult. Moreover, where there have been events that can properly be categorised as, for example, administrative action (or come within any of the other section 30A(b) criteria), that is not the end of the case. This leads to the final point.

The second part of this final stage involves determining whether the sole or predominant cause of the worker’s disability was any one or more of the disqualifying factors identified during the first part of this stage. Naturally, other potential causative factors will need to be identified at this time and a decision made about whether either the non-work factors or the section 30A(b)(i) to (iv) disqualifying factors were the sole or predominant cause of the worker’s disability. In other words, this phase will necessarily involve an investigation into what other factors might be affecting the worker and might have given rise to the disability and which factors are the sole or predominant cause of the disability.

I do not think that a strict rule can be set as to whether, when you reach this final stage, you should first consider whether the disqualifying provisions apply (and if so, which of them), or whether you should first consider what was the sole or predominant cause of the disability. It will simply be a question of adopting the approach which appears the most practical in the circumstances.

5. CONCLUSION

Claims of this type continue to be lodged. They have to be assessed. This exercise will rarely be easy. While the application of the principles to the facts will, I am sure, remain a difficult task, the law on section 30A has developed significantly. Indeed, it has developed to a stage where, following a proper investigation of the facts you should be well placed to reach a firm view (or as firm a view as one can in litigation law) on what is probably the most difficult area of workers compensation law.

Employers who are prepared to actively support and develop a workplace environment that is committed to and fosters open communication with employees and set up policies and procedures to implement this will be in an excellent position of minimising its employees developing stress-related illnesses.

John Fountain

6 September 2005

[1] Disability is defined by section 3 of the Act as including any mental injury, including a disease which, in turn (as defined), includes a “mental ailment, disorder, defect or morbid condition, whether or sudden or gradual development”. Disability is also specifically defined to include “a secondary disability” which itself is separately defined in section 3.

[2] Keen v Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Corporation (1998) 71 SASR 42 at 46.

[3] J.D. 124/1999.

[4] For simplicity I will simply refer to the Workers Compensation Tribunal as the Tribunal throughout this paper.

[5] The Smith’s Snackfood Co Ltd v Zienkiewicz [2002] SAWCT 48 at paragraph 11.

[6] SA Mental Health Services Inc v Murgush unreported Full Supreme Court 8 September 1995 judgment number S5246.

[7] [2000] SAWCT 42.

[8] As above, at page 23, paragraph 83.

[9] Institute of Medical and Veterinary Science v Auld [2000] SAWCT 155 per Jennings PJ and Cawthorne DPJ at page 10, paragraph 28.

[10] [2002] SAWCT 39.

[11] As above, at paragraphs 5 and 6.

[12] WorkCover/Allianz Australia (Jarrett Synergy) v McLeod [2003] SAWCT 8 at paragraphs 19 and 28.

[13] (1995) 65 SASR 243.

[14] As above, at page 248.

[15] See also the decision of Keen (cited at page 3, footnote 3) for further discussion of this provision.

[16] A.45/1994.

[17] As above, at page 4.

[18] A.72/1995.

[19] As above, at page 10.

[20] [2003] SAWCT 54.

[21] As above, at paragraphs 26 and 27 (His Honour recently re-stated his comments in these paragraphs in the case of Doolan v South Australian Water Corporation [2005] SAWCT 13 at paragraph 20).

[22] J.D.39/1999.

[23] As above, at page 6.

[24] J.D.37/1999.

[25] As above, at page 7.

[26] Cited at page 6, footnote 13.

[27] As above, at page 248.

[28] Cited at page 3, footnote 2.

[29] As above, at page 5.

[30] Assuming that it is conduct that otherwise comes within one of the exclusionary provisions.

“Stress” Claims: Interpreting Section 30A of the South Australian Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1986

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